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1. Principles and guarantees in constitutional law 
Looking at the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic and at 
the German constitution, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, there can be seen at the first glance a striking difference. 
32 DIKEITO Ε JUSTICA 
The Constitution of Portugal, beyond a catalogue of rights, freedoms 
and safeguards in protection of individual liberty and political parti­
cipation, encloses a comprehensive array of "Rights, freedoms and 
safeguards of the workers" and of "Economic, social and cultural 
rights and duties" and additionally a vast regulation and programme of 
"Economic organisation". Compared with this constitutional style and 
politics, the German Basic Law acquiesces in a short suite of funda­
mental liberties and in the rather vague directives, that Germany is a 
social state and that public finance must take into account the requi­
rements of the equilibrium in the overall economic demand and supply 
("gesamtwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht"). Only in Art. 15, concerning 
socialisation and collective economic management ("Gemeinwirt­
schaft"), there is an enabling clause for a public property of the means 
of production, which could be introduced by law and against indem-
nization. On the federal level, there has never been an attempt to make 
use of this old socialistic memory sign. 
Of course, this is not the place for a full scale comparative 
analysis of the constitutional law and policy in Portugal and in Ger­
many, concerning economic organization. Anyhow it must be noted, 
that the outward disparity of the two constitutions is accompanied by 
substantial differences in the subject matter. Fundamental principles of 
the economic organization in Portugal are inter alia (1) co-existence 
of the public, the private and the cooperative and social sectors with 
respect to the ownership of the means of production, (2) collective 
ownership of means of production and land as required by the public 
interest, (3) collective ownership of the natural resources, and (4) 
democratic planning of the economy. These principles may include a 
broad margin of legislative decision and discretion. But they give 
public property and political direction and intervention in the shaping 
of economic organisation a conspicuous stress. This is quite divergent 
from the constitutional situation in Germany. To say more or even to 
go to an evaluative comparison would require a consideration of the 
different social situation and development in both countries. This goes 
far beyond the scope of my task and my possibilities. It is in the last 
resort an agendum of the European Economic Community. The prin­
ciples of the European Economic Community demand an appro­
ximation of economic and social conditions in the Common Mar­
ket, but they respect the different national economic organisation. 
The Treaty of the European Economic Community does not touch on 
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the property order in the different member states (Art. 222 EEC-
-Treaty). 
The scarcely of explicit clauses on economic policy and econo­
mic organisation in the German Basic Law has been, from the begin­
ning, a field of dispute. The Bundesverfassungsgericht very early has 
laid down the key thesis, that constitutional law does not fix a certain 
economic organization and does not prescribe a certain economic 
policy. Economic liberty, protection of property, free enterprise and 
market economy under social limitations are constitutional corner­
stones. But the constitution leaves an open way for an economic policy 
and a change of economic policy in the frame, the constitutional law 
sets for legislation *. In this understanding the Basic Law is econo­
mically neutral ("wirtschaftspolitisch neutral"). Therefore the cons­
titution encloses no precise directive for the delimitation of the public 
sector of economy and for the grade or dimension of public enterprise 
and public property. There is no constitutional precept that public 
property which is not necessary for administrative tasks or for welfare 
policies should be transfered into private ownership. Equally there is no 
principle that the State should participate in the economy especially in 
the sphere of production or services only if there is a special or pre­
vailing public interest. This is — apart from intervention into existing 
rights and from expropriation — a matter of convenience and appro­
priate policy. Privatization might be, in general or in single cases, a 
reasonable policy, as the programme of the present German gouver-
nement proclaims2 and its practise shows. It is constitutionally possible, 
but not a constitutional necessity. A divergent estimation must take 
place for the special and singular case of the enterprises in the former 
German Democratic Republic which are administered by a trusteeship 
agency. Here privatization, including reprivatization, is part of trans­
forming a socialist economy into a privately managed market economy. 
The constitutional problem of privatization has been the subject 
of a famous lawsuit at the Bundesverfassungsgericht, thirty years ago3. 
ι BVerfGE 4,7/17; 50,290/338. 
2 Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, Gesamtkonzept fur die Privatisierungs­
und Beteiligungspolitik des Bundes, Zeitschrift fur öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaft­
liche Unternehmen (ZögU) 8,1985, p. 203. 
3 Bundesverfassungsgericht, sentence from Mai 17th, 1961, BVerfGE 12, 
354.- R. Schmidt, Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 1990, pp. 144 sqq. 
2 
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A part of the shares of the Volkswagenwerk, a limited liability 
company, originally belonging to the Reich, later owned by the Bund, 
had been transferred into private ownership by a law from July 21th, 
1960 (BGBl. I p. 585). The employees of the enterprise had been 
given a preference in the acquisition of the new company with mixed 
public and private ownership. The law has been constitutionally 
contested in several regards. One point of censure was that this act of 
privatization would run against Art. 15 GG. This constitutional clause 
says: Landed property, natural resources and means of production can 
for the purpose of socialization be transferred into public property or 
other forms of collective public management, by a law which adjusts 
kind and amount of indemnization. The constitution acknowledges the 
substantial difference of expropriation, which is a way of providing a 
specific object, especially a piece of land, for a defined public pur­
pose, and socialization, which is a key procedure in transforming 
private market economy into some form of collective production with 
participation of the employees and a non-profit guideline. Notwith­
standing this difference, the Art. 15 GG does not say, socialization 
should be accomplished, but only that it could be realized, and the 
clause lays down the duty of indemnization. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled that the constitution does 
not include a norm which would generally inhibit the selling of enter­
prises in the ownership of the Bund and without any public purpose. 
Especially could Art. 15 GG not be construed as containing such an 
inhibition. This clause contains no mandate for socialization, but only 
an enabling for the legislation; beyond this it includes no precept to 
abstain from any act which might impede a future socialization. These 
sentences conform with the mentioned keynote of the Basic Law to 
prescribe no definite economic policy. In the merits of this decision 
we find the following evaluation of a privatization policy which shall 
conclude my assessment of the constititional framework: "The idea (of 
privatization) conforms to the leading picture of a market economy 
which rests on the free competition of private enterprises and refu­
ses the State as entrepreneur insofar as it does not pursue acknowled­
ged public tasks. Connected with this is the specific social and basic 
policy aim of a "broad spreading" of property rights, stemming from 
privatization by which could be contributed to the building up of 
property in groups of persons who had until now a living only from a 
salary". 
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2. Politics and legal framework of privatization in Germany 
a) Deregulation and privatization as a legal problem of eco-
nomic policy 
The debate on privatization is part of the political and legal 
debate on the role of the State and the democratic political forces in 
the organization and functioning of economy. The liberal constitution 
followed the guideline, that economic production and distribution is a 
matter for private action, initiative and enterprise. The State must set 
the legal framework of the economic process, must intervene to secure 
the public interest and to protect the individual against economic 
power and abuse and, lastly, must operate certain public services 
which cannot be left to the market forces of demand and supply, for 
instance public transport, postal services or communal services. The 
borderline between State intervention and public enterprise and, on the 
other side, private and market economy has a different topography 
from country to country. For a long time in this century the trend was 
for a steady enlargement of the public sector, under the scope of 
welfare state politics and somewhere with a strong emphasis on 
socialist programmes. The last decennium, in Germany and elsewhere, 
has brought a shift of the evolution. The insight into the defectiveness 
of a planned economy with crippled private action and private auto­
nomy has grown, the causes of the wealth of nations are reconsidered. 
Α batüecry of the new economic politics is the concept of "dere­
gulation'*. This means, in a narrower sense, a loosening of regulations 
concerning the market competition and the fixing of prizes and trading 
terms by the way of demand and supply. In a broader sense, the 
deregulation debate covers the question, in what scale the production 
and supply of goods and services shall be effected by private enter­
prise, without influence or impeding through public intervention or 
regulation4. A part of this deregulation debate is the question of 
privatization. To look at privatization from the angle of deregulation 
shows the context with the problems of a reduction of the public debt 
and of a retrenchement of subventions. The operating of a public 
enterprise which is economically not successful is in substance equi-
4 R. Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 48 sqq. 
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valent to subventioning a private enterprise which does not earn its 
costs of production. This might be, for a limited time and under clear 
reasons of structural policy, a justified action of public interest. In a 
certain core of services of public necessity this course of action even 
is unevitable. But outside such fields of plain and strong public inte­
rest the operating or subventioning of a deficit enterprise is a waste of 
public funds and a mismanagement in the employment of economic 
means and of labour. 
Legally, privatization is the transfer of public tasks or of public 
means, mainly of public enterprises, from the State or another public 
entity to the disposition of a private subject, generally a private 
corporation. An essential distinction is necessary in the following way. 
The privatization can consist — first — in the establishing of an 
enterprise in the legal form of the private company law, for instance a 
joint-stock company, with all shares or the majority of the shares 
remaining in public ownership. This we would call a "formal" or 
"organizational" privatization. The State or another public entity in 
this case uses the advantages of the private law organization for a 
special task. For instance a municipality operates the communal 
traffic, or other public utilities by a limited liability company or a 
public broadcasting service produces the advertising spots by a private 
affiliate company. 
In the case of organizational privatization the public shareholder 
remains in charge of the public task. The private law organization is 
only instrumental, though, under German law of joint-stock compa­
nies, the purpose of the enterprise and not the interest of the domina­
ting shareholder is the guideline of the management. To a certain 
degree, the use of private company law slackens the influence of the 
public shareholder. 
Privatization can — secondly — transfer a public task or a 
public enterprise to a privately owned or privately dominated com­
pany. This we would call a "material" or "substantial" privatization. 
Here a real change in the operation of a former public task or enter­
prise takes place. A presupposition for such a proceeding will , of 
course, be that private capital is at large and that the object of the trans­
action is of sufficient interest for a private investor. A public enterprise 
without a good prospect in the market might not be a suitable object of 
privatization. A special case is the reprivatization, that is the restitu­
tion of a former private piece of land or enterprise to the original 
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owner or his legal successors. A dominant problem of the recon­
struction of a market economy in Eastern Germany is the possible 
conflict between the claims of former owners, who want reprivatiza-
tion, and the public interest for a speedy privatization by a selling to 
the fittest investor. 
b) Policy of privatization in Germany 
After this general and conceptual outline of the legal questions of 
privatization, I shall give a sketch of the actual development and prac­
tice in Germany. I distinguish three different areas: 
— The intensified and programmatic policy of privatization Of 
the Bund after the change of government 1982; 
— the efforts of a privatization in the field of public utilities, 
especially in the realm of municipal services and of railway, 
postal services and telecommunication; 
— the economic reconstruction in the former German Demo­
cratic Republic (DDR) under the guidance of the Ireuhan-
danstalt (trusteeship agency). 
The coalition government which came into power after the fall of 
the social-liberal coalition is a strong advocate of a social modified 
market economy, based on private initiative and enterprise. "In the 
years of the eighties privatization is part of the embracing question, 
which goods and services are to be offered by the State. This policy 
goes into the direction of a limitation of public production, of a 
lowering of the public quota of the national product, of a reducing of 
public tasks, of less State"3. After the stating of principles, a process 
of privatization of industrial assets has started, most prominent the 
privatization of the vast VEBA combine6. In 1985 a "General concept 
for the policy of the Bund concerning privatization and share-holding" 
has been published7. The public share-holding in the area of entre-
5 K. König, Entwicklung der Privatisierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
—Probleme, Stand, Ausblick—, Verwalrungs-Archiv 79,1988, p. 241/242. 
* J. Esser, 'Symbolic Privatisation': The Politics of Privatisation in Western 
Germany, West European Politics 11, 1988, p. 61; K. König, op. cit., pp. 251 sqq. 
7 Bundesminister der Finanzen, op. cit. 
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preneurial activities is to be checked with the criterion, if public inte­
rest justifies a further public engagement. To understand this, it must be 
added that the greater part of public shareholding is an inheritance from 
the Reich and from Prussia. An assessment of the costs and profits out 
of this conglomerate public property produced the result that in all the 
budget of the Bund had to carry a loss of several billions in the period 
from 1970 to 1982. The mentioned "general concept" states the 
precedence of private initiative and private property as policy guideline, 
demands privatization in those cases, where a sufficient public interest 
of the share-holding is not or not any longer justified, and requires the 
creation of the conditions for a privatization, where a share is unfit for 
privatization, for instance for want of sufficient returns. 
The implementation of this ambitious programme has made 
some progress8, but will not lead to a substantial cut in public enter­
prises. A fair evaluation must regard the interdependence of priva­
tization policies with the cutting of subventions and with the complex 
endeavours of deregulation. The Federal Gouvernment stresses the 
necessity of strengthening the market competition and of removing 
impediments for the approach to the market. This policy is in accor­
dance with the requirements of European Law, in part even a reali­
zation of demands of the European Community. Sometimes it has 
been spoken of the "timidity" of the privatization process in Germany. 
But this judgment has been fairly accompanied with the reasons of this 
peculiarity: "In summing up the reasons for the slow privatization pro­
cess in West Germany it is important... to note that public ownership 
of industrial corporations is relatively insignificant. All those indus­
tries and corporations which are in the long run strategically important 
for the maintenance of key positions in world markets are privately 
owned. Private capital is the foundation and the driving force of Ger­
man economy ... Equally the private banks occupy a vital role in this 
process (of structural adaptation to the new competitive international 
environment)...The debate on privatization of public assets has ... 
8 Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1990 der Bondesregierung, Bundestag Drucksache 
11/6278, p. 19. — The Federal Gouvernment in 1990 has decided on a new compre­
hensive concept for the privatization and share-holding policy of the Bund. The public 
interest in all assets of the Bund shall be scrutinized anew, ussig a critical criterion; 
some public assets are enumerated in this new programme from November 28th, 
1990, as primary objects of a privatization. S. v. Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1991 der 
Bundesregierung, Bundestag Drucksache 12/223, pp. 23 sq. 
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focused on a few companies which, for historical reasons, were publicly 
owned and have become profitable in the post-war era: Preussag, VW, 
Veba, Lufthansa and some state-owned banks. The disputes over whether 
and when to privatize, and how much to privatize, were inspired by 
fiscal, distributional and industrial policy concerns, and supplemented by 
the interests of a small group of rich investors who wished to expand 
their portfolios.... Public assets will not be privatized if they are conside­
red indispensable for regional and industrial policy" 9 . All this, of course, 
does not apply to the necessary privatizations in Eastern Germany. The 
extraordinary situation of public management of the former socialist 
means of production can only last for a limited period and is strictly 
bound to the final purpose of creating a market economy, based on 
private enterprise. The present public operation of those enterprises shall 
not issue into a permanent establishment of new enterprises of the Bund. 
Only for a time of transition, the public finance can give subventions to 
enterprises which are in principle fit for privatization, that means, have 
the prospect to become profitable participants in market competition. I 
shall recur later to this special privatization problem. 
A second area to be contemplated are the efforts of a priva­
tization in the field of public utilities, especially in the realm of muni­
cipal services and of railway, postal services and telecommunication. 
There is no dispute that the key positions of transport, communication, 
communal services and energy supply cannot be operated alone by 
private business. In the contrary, here the public management must 
prevail, at least by a strong supervision and even, if necessary, by 
subventions. Anyhow, there are many sectors of communal activities, 
that could be objects of privatization and would possibly perform 
better and even cheaper services, if privately operated, as cultural 
establishments, hospitals, touristic services, cleaning services etc.10. 
The opinion on the usefulness or desirability of privatization in these 
cases will vary, according to the general political outlook. The profit-
orientated operation of services tends to neglect those branches of 
performance which are expensive, but — on the other hand — offers 
the only reliable criteria to measure costs and efficiency. 
9 J. Esser, 'Symbolic Privatisation', op. cit, pp 70 qq. 
i° W. Graf Vitzthum, Gemeinderechtliche Grenzen der Privatisierung kommu­
naler Wirtschaftsuntemehmen, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 104,1979, p. 580; K. 
König, op. cit., pp. 260 sqq. 
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The reform in the field of public utilities does not look alone at the 
instrument of a transfer of services to private enterprises. Another means 
of deregulation is the opening for competition, especially in the case of 
services which until now are protected by public monopolies. Two im­
portant examples in Germany are the broadcasting system and the postal 
services. From the beginning, the broadcasting, including television, was 
only in the hands of public institutions. This situation was not consti­
tutionally necessary. The constitutional liberty of broadcasting can be 
safeguarded in the forms of public law, which is difficult, but equally 
difficult in the case of private broadcasting corporations. In the last ten 
years there has developed a dual broadcasting system and meanwhile we 
find a sometimes refreshing journalistic and economic competition of the 
old public institutions and the new private corporations. 
A development of great significance also is the opening of the 
telecommunication market by the reform law of 1989 The mono­
poly of the Bund has been restricted to the operation of the telecom­
munication net, the wireless installations and the telephon service. But 
even in these monopoly areas the government can allow single private 
market participation. The public services are maintained, but they 
must suffer private competition, as in the case of mobile wireless 
service. 
Another element of the Bundespost-reform consisted in the 
separation of the political and administrative powers, which are in the 
competence of the ministry, and the entrepreneurial and management 
tasks, which now are in the hand of public enterprises, regulated by 
the law. The government is on the way to frame a further step of 
reform, which would alter the organizational form of the postal enter­
prises into a private law corporation, i.e. a joint stock company. This 
would be a partial privatization. Private shareholders could enlarge the 
financial basis of such new corporations. The majority position of the 
public assets shall not be touched, so that there would be only an 
organizational and not a substantial privatization12. A progress of this 
reform idea is not only a matter of legislation, but presupposes an 
amendment of the constitution. By virtue of Art. 87 paragraph 1 of the 
" Gesetz zur Neustrukturierung des Post- und Fernmeldewesens und der 
Deutschen Bundespost (Poststrukturgesetz), June 8th, 1989 (BGBl. I p. 1026). 
12 G. Krupp, Postreform — zweite Stufe, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Dec. 4th, 1991. 
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Basic Law the organization of the postal services is in principle deter­
mined by public law and must be a component of the administration of 
the Bund. This organizational chain must be loosened and a new 
constitutional clause must empower the legislator to choose for the 
Bundespost the organizational structure of a private law corporation. 
3. The economic reconstruction in the former German Democra­
tic Republic (DDR) under the guidance of the "Treuhandanstalt" 
a) Legal basis and political conditions 
The political unification of Germany must be completed by a 
reconstruction of the economy in the new Eastern Länder and an 
adaptation of the economic and social conditions of living, work and 
production. The legal conditions have been created by the two funda­
mental treaties, the Treaty on the Creating of a Currency-, Economy-
and Social Union between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic from May 18th, 1990, and the Treaty 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democra­
tic Republic on the Establishing of the Unity of Germany ("Einigungs­
vertrag") from August 31th, 1990. The Einigungsvertrag, notwithstan­
ding a plenty of transition regulations, has set up a unified legal order 
on the basis of the law and constitution of Western Germany. Anyhow, 
the restoring of an efficient and just economy in the former DDR will 
be a process of a few years. 
The economy of the DDR was based on the socialist property of 
the means of production. The economy was steered and planned by' 
instruments of socialist planned economy management and of a 
socialist economy law. The organizational units of the economy were 
state-owned combines and enterprises. The certain autonomy of these 
units of "people's property" in the framework of planned economy 
remained a reflex of the thorough-going central steering and planning 
of the economic process. Agriculture, trade and craft also were orga­
nized in forms of people's property; they operated collectivated in co­
operatives, apart from an insignificant sector of small private shops. 
Under these conditions, privatization in connection with the re­
unification of Germany is only an element in the allembracing process 
of transformation from socialist economy without any substantial 
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private enterprise and production into a market economy based on 
private initiative and property. This abrupt structural change of the 
social and economic system was connected with heavy cuts in 
production and employment. It has laid open fundamental deficiencies 
of productivity and distribution ingrained in the socialist economic 
system. Large sectors of the East German industry are unable to 
supply the market with goods and services, which could find a custo­
mer. Additionally, the former trade relations with the Soviet Union 
and the other Comecon countries could not continue13. All this de­
monstrates the singularity of privatization policy as a part of economic 
reconstruction after the fall of the socialist system. 
The first step of reorganization, effectuated under the old regime, 
was the transformation of the state-owned combines and enterprises 
into private law companies, joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies14. The second step, also under the old regime, was the 
creating of an agency for the administration of the people's property 
on a trusteeship basis ('Treuhandanstalt") by a resolution of the Volks­
kammer from March 1st, 1990. The first unification treaty from Mai 
18th, 1990 stated: It will be carried through an inventory of the peo­
ple-owned assets. The people-owned assets are to be used predomi­
nantly for the structural adjustment of the economy and for the esta­
blishment of sound conditions of the State budget (Art. 26 par 4). The 
operation of the Treuhandanstalt was regulated by the Law for the Pri­
vatization and Reorganization of the people-owned assets ("Treuhand-
gesetz") from June 17th, 1990 (GBl. I p. 300). The target of the law is, 
to reduce the enterpreneurial activity of the State by the privatization 
of the people-owned assets, as speedily and as far as possible. Certain 
parts of these assets can be given to the Länder or to municipal 
corporations. The Treuhandanstalt is a public institution under the 
supervision of the prime Minister with the task to privatize and utilize 
people-owned assets, according to the principles of social market 
» Wirtschaftsförderung in den neuen Bundesländern, in: Monatsberichte der 
Deutschen Bundesbank 1991, Nr. 3, p. 15; Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1991 der Bun­
desregierung, op. cit., pp. 12 sqq. 
ι 4 D. Maskow, Die Umwandlung von volkseigenen Betrieben in Kapitalge­
sellschaften, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 1990, Beilage 5, p. 1. — Verord­
nung zur Umwandlung von volkseigenen Kombinaten, Betrieben und Einrichtungen 
in Kapitalgesellschaften vom 1.3.1990 (GBl. I p. 107). 
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economy. The Einigungsvertrag has maintained the Treuhandanstalt 
and—with small adaptations — the Treuhandgesetz (Art. 25)15. 
The privatization task of the Treuhandanstalt and the economic 
reconstruction in Eastern Germany as a whole are overshadowed by 
the complex and difficult problem of the restitution of property which 
has been confiscated or expropriated by the Soviet occupation autho­
rities or the German socialist regime. The State-owned landed pro­
perty and the State-owned enterprises stem to a very large part from 
former private owners, who have lost their property against their will. 
Legally those confiscations or expropriations, arbitrary and unjust as 
they were, can not be measured by the rules and standards of the Basic 
Law. They happened out of the area of applicability of the Basic Law. 
On the other hand, these assets and this property now, by virtue of the 
reunification and mediated by the Treuhandanstalt, are under the 
disposition of the Federal Government. Therefore it is a necessity of 
justice and a demand of the constitutional guarantee of property to 
find a fair adjustment between the concerns of former owners, the 
rights of new private owners and the public interest in a speedy 
reconstruction and recovery with the engagement of private investors. 
The solution, which can only be outlined here, is not yet completed16. 
The decisive advance has been the Joint Declaration of the 
Gouvernments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the German 
Democratic Republic concerning the Settlement of Open Property 
Questions from June 15th, 1990. The Declaration states that the con­
fiscations between 1945 and 1949 cannot be revoked, notwithstanding 
a compensation by the State on the basis of a future law. Landed 
property shall be returned to the former owners or their heirs with the 
exception of pieces of land with a new usage of public interest or of an 
otherwise irrevocable new usage, and with the exception of pieces of 
land which have been honestly purchased by a third party. The former 
owner gets an indemnization if the restoration is excluded or if he 
1 5 W. Möschei, Treuhandanstalt und Neuordnung der früheren DDR-Wirt­
schaft, Zeitschrift fur Gesellschaftsrecht 1991, p. 175. 
1 6 B. Czerwenka, Rückgabe enteigneter Unternehmen in den neuen Bundes­
ländern, 1991; S. Jung/M. Vec, Juristische Schulung 1991, p. 714; D. Weber/A. 
Wilhelm, Die Enteignungen unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft und ihre 
Behandlung im Einigungsvertrag, Betriebs-Berater, 1991, Beilage 3, p. 12; P. Badura, 
Der Verfassungsauftrag der Eigentumsgarantie im wiedervereinigten Deutschland, 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1990, p. 1256. 
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chooses indemnization instead of restoration. Enterprises and shares 
which have been transferred into people's property by confiscation 
between 1949 and 1972 are returned to the former owner, if he does 
not take indemnization instead of restoration; the development of the 
value of the asset is taken into account. 
This Joint Declaration has been incorporated into the Einigungs­
vertrag (Art. 41). Additionally the Federal Republic has undergone the 
obligation to set no law in contradiction to the said Joint Declaration. 
As a supplement the Einigungsvertrag has opened the possibility, to 
exclude the restoration of landed property if this should be required 
for urgent purposes of investment To carry out those basic regulations 
in Art. 41, into the Einigungsvertrag have been inserted as an annexe 
two laws: the Law concerning the Settlement of Open Property Ques­
tions and the Law on Special Investments in the German Democratic 
Republic. If you set aside the cases between 1945 and 1949 the basic 
ideas of the settlement can be stated in two slogans: "Restoration goes 
befor indemnization" and "Right of way for investments". The better 
and speedier investor has in the process of privatization a better right 
than the former owner, who demands reprivatization. This rule has 
even been strengthened by amendments which have been effectuated 
through the Law for the Removal of Impediments in the course of 
Privatization of Enterprises and for the Furthering of Investments from 
March 22th, 1991 (BGBl. I p. 766). 
The Settlement of Open Property Questions by the Joint Decla­
ration from June 15th, 1990, and by the Art. 41 Einigungsvertrag has 
been constitutionally secured by amendments of the Basic Law which 
have been enacted as a part of the Einigungsvertrag itself (Art. 4 Nr. 4, 
5). The new Art. 143 par. 3 GG says that Art. 41 Einigungsvertrag and 
regulations in pursuance thereof are of lasting duration insofar as they 
provide that encroachments on property are not revoked. The new Art. 
135 a par. 2 GG states that the assessement of indemnizations in this 
respect which has to be regulated by law may determine that the 
indemnization obligations by the State under certain conditions must 
not be fulfilled or must not be fulfilled completely. Insofar as these 
constitutional amendments cover the confiscations between 1945 and 
1949, they have been attacked before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
In its sentence from April 23rd, 1991, the court has rejected the 
reproach of unconstitutionality and has given some hints for the asses­
sement of the due compensation. 
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The assessement of compensation in the case of the confisca­
tions between 1945 and 1949 and equally the regulation of the 
indemnization in the cases between 1949 and 1972 when the former 
owner has no right of restoration or chooses indemnization instead of 
restoration) has proved very difficult and controversial. The rules for 
compensation and for indemnization must follow the same basic 
criteria. Insofar there can be no difference between the years before 
and after 1949. Futher, equal treatment must be secured for those, who 
get their land or enterprise back, and those who only get an indem­
nization. Therefore the title of restoration is onerated with a charge to 
compensate the advantage of the restoration value. Recently the main 
lines of a draft for the necessary law have been published which has 
been prepared in the Ministry of Finance17. The compensation or inde­
mnization for confiscations or expropriations shall generally be fixed 
. at 1,3 times the assessed standard value of 1935, reduced by formerly 
paid compensations. In the case of restoration the owner shall pay a 
charge of 30 percent of the restored value, measured by a defined 
Standard assessment. 
b) The Treukandanstalt and its practise 
The Treuhandanstalt now is a public law institution of the Bund 
under the supervision of the Minister of Finance and with the man­
date, to give the former people-owned enterprises a structure fit for 
competition in the market economy and to privatize those enterpri­
ses18. It is empowered to borrow funds until a fixed amount. The 
returns of privatizations may only be used for measures concerning 
the economy in the former DDR. 
1 7 Rückgabe beweglicher Guter nicht vorgesehen, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 5.12.1991. 
1 8 Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ed., Die Tätigkeit der Treuhandanstalt, 
November 1991; R. Schmidt, Aufgaben und Struktur der Treuhandanstalt im Wandel : 
der Wirtschaftslage, in: P. Hommelhoff, ed., Treuhandunternehmen im Umbruch, 
1991, p. 17; R. Weimar, Treuhandanstalt und Privatisierung, Der Betrieb 1991, 584.-
The decisions of the Treuhandanstalt, by which the tide of restoration is overruled in 
favour of an investor is an administrative act (s.v. § 3 a par. 3,4 Vermögensgesetz). R. 
Weimar, Handlungsformen und Handlungsfelder der Treuhandanstalt — öffentlich­
rechtlich oder privatrechtlich? Die öffentliche Verwaltung 1991, p. 813. 
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The Treuhandanstalt is organizationally an agency, a public ins­
titution ("bundesunmittelbare Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts"), but in 
substance a gigantic combined enterprise. 
It operates with a businesslike management and in the forms of 
private law1 9. Anyhow it fulfills a public task and is bound to the 
public concerns which are laid down in the law. The contracts of the 
Treuhandanstalt and the purchasing parties are subjected to the requi­
rements of competition and cartel law. The resulting enterprise struc­
ture and market conditions must conform to the rules of market com­
petition; privatization enjoys no priviledges or favoured positions. 
Further, the Treuhandanstalt operates under the rule of budget law and 
is supervised by the budget committee of the Bundestag which has 
installed a subcommittee for the matters of Treuhand enterprises. To 
facilitate Treuhandanstalt privatization the procedure of budget law 
allowance in the case of share selling has been modified. 
By the Treuhandanstalt the Bund holds the shares of the former 
socialist enterprises. Privatization is carried through by private law 
contracts with the new owner. In those contracts the Treuhandanstalt 
includes clauses by which the purchasing party is bound to effect an 
agreed amount of investments in a fixed time and to keep the emplo­
yees of the privatized enterprise for a fixed period. These investment 
and employment commitments influence the value of the purchased 
enterprise and, of course, reduce the price the Treuhandanstalt can 
obtain. By those commitment clauses the Treuhandanstalt can follow 
up some kind of structural policy. But it should be noted that the Treu-
handanstalt has no mandate and powers for a full scale structural poli­
cy. It is no new steering and planning agency; its function is limited 
and transitional, with 1995 as projected deadline. 
Neither is it the principal task of the Treuhandanstalt to reha­
bilitate enterprises by establishing sound conditions and granting of 
subventions. In accordance with the guideline of the Federal Gouver­
nement it has firmly opposed the demands of the opposition parties 
and the trade unions to rehabilitate enterprises which have no fore-
seeble future in the market competition. If an assessement shows that 
an enterprise can be made fit for privatization this possibility has to be 
used and insofar the enterprise will be rehabilitated and kept alive. 
1 9 S. v. Antrag der Fraktion der SPD, Bundestag Drucksache 12/615; Beschluß­
empfehlung und Bericht des Haushaltsausschusses, Bundestag Drucksache 12/1204. 
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Similarly such an enterprise will be freed of debts or encumbrances. 
Old debts are widely a result of arbitrary allotments of the socialist 
planning bureaucracy. They should not impede an otherwise success­
ful rehabilitation and privatization of an enterprise with a future20. But 
here as anyway the Treuhand-policy cannot follow the target to 
maintain an industrial structure which — due to the fundamental 
miscarriage of the socialist economy — is inefficient and without 
prospect under market conditions. Privatization and investments with 
calculated market success are the only promising way of reconstruc­
tion in Eastern Germany which cannot remain a zone of continuated 
economic weakness 2 1 . 
The operation of the Treuhandanstalt has been quite successful, 
under the given circumstances. Until the end of October 1991 about 
4.000 cases of privatization have been dealt with. An amount of 85 
billion DM commitments of investments have been secured. In the 
course of privatization the Treuhandanstalt had to reform the structure 
of the industry units, especially by deconcentration and decartelization 
of the about 8.000 combines and enterprises which had originally 
come into the portfolio of the Bund. The former stateowned property 
did, of course, not only consist of means of production. Insofar as it 
has an administrative or municipal purpose, it does not belong to the 
fonds for privatization, but must be allotted to the respective public 
entities, mainly the new Lander and the municipalities. The definition 
and allotment of these objects is regulated by the Einigungsvertrag 
(Art. 21, 22) and additional laws22. This also is a task of the Treu-
handanstalt with a broad and complicated array of administrative and 
legal problems. 
At the beginning, it had been estimated that the returns of priva­
tization would produce a remarkable surplus. This estimation will not 
realize. The expenditure for economic and technical rehabilitation of 
the enterprises, the decharging of debts, the reduced proceeds of sales 
and the necessities of reprivatization accumulate to a substantial defi­
cit of the Treuhandanstalt, amounting to about 30 billion DM per year. 
2 0 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Große Anfrage betr. Treuhänderische 
Verwaltung des volkseigenen Vermögens der DDR, Bundestag Drucksache 12/1207. 
2 1 Bsp. Gesetz über die Feststellung der Zuordnung von ehemals volkseigenem 
Vermögen vom 22.3.1991 (BGBl. I p. 766,784). 
22 S. v. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, op. cit. pp. 28 sqq. 
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This demonstrates that privatization policies as an element of the 
transformation of a planned public economy into an economy based 
on private ownership and enterprise inevitably is a policy of structural 
shaping and organization, to create the elementary conditions of pri­
vate market economy. This limited aim is a contribution to the steady 
programme of reducing the State to the core of his public tasks, 
thereby securing the predominance of private initiative and private 
property in a free society. 
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